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Whether observed differences in redistributive policies across countries are the result of 
differences in social preferences or efficiency constraints is an important question that paves 
the debate about the optimality of welfare regimes. To shed new light on this question, we 
estimate labor supply elasticities on microdata and adopt an inverted optimal tax approach to 
characterize the redistributive preferences embodied in the welfare systems of 17 EU 
countries and the US. Implicit social welfare functions are broadly compatible with the fiction 
of an optimizing Paretian social planner. Some exceptions due to generous demogrant 
transfers are consistent with the ignorance of behavioral responses by some European 
governments and are partly corrected by recent policy developments. Heterogeneity in 
leisure-consumption preferences somewhat affect the international comparison in degrees of 
revealed inequality aversion, but differences in social preferences are significant only between 
broad groups of countries. 
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The level of redistribution via tax and transfer programs di⁄ers greatly across welfare regimes.
It is not clear whether this is due to contrasted redistributive tastes or simply the fact that some
countries face tighter e¢ ciency constraints, i.e., redistribution is less easily achieved because of
more elastic labor supply. This question paves the debate about the optimality of tax-bene￿t
systems in industrialized countries and the comparisons that can be made of these systems. As
yet, it has not received a comprehensive treatment given the di¢ culty to obtain comparable
information about labor supply responsiveness across countries (see Evers et al., 2008, and our
companion paper Bargain et al., 2011). For instance, recent attempts using optimal tax theory to
compare the implicit cost of redistribution (Immervoll et al., 2007) or the tax-bene￿t treatment
of couples (Immervoll et al., 2011) across many European countries have relied on "plausible"
elasticities from the literature but had no information about the actual cross-country di⁄erences
in labor supply behavior.
The present paper aims to ￿ll this gap by bringing optimal tax theory to the data. Using
harmonized household surveys for 17 EU countries and the US, we ￿rst estimate the labor supply
elasticities consistent with the optimal income tax model of Saez (2002). We then invert this
model to characterize the redistributive preferences embodied in actual tax-bene￿t systems. In
this way, usual observations about tax-bene￿t systems are directly cast in terms of social welfare
language, and we quantify the extent to which inequality aversion truly di⁄ers across countries
once country-speci￿c labor supply behavior is accounted for.
An important contribution of the paper is to provide elasticities which are coherent with
the optimal tax model and accordingly estimated on the same micro data used for the optimal
tax inversion. Since there is no natural experiment that can be used to capture behavioral
parameters in a comparable way across countries, we opt for a structural model which is speci￿ed
and estimated in the same fashion for all countries. Importantly, this model can account for
the comprehensive e⁄ect of tax-bene￿t policies on household budgets, which makes estimated
behavior consistent with the e¢ ciency constraints of national social planners in the optimal
tax characterization. Also, nonlinearities and discontinuities from tax-bene￿t rules improve the
identi￿cation of the empirical model, together with demographic heterogeneity and some spatial
and time variation in net wages. For this purpose, the present study bene￿ts from a unique
set of comparable data and from tax-bene￿t calculators made available for numerous European
countries (EUROMOD) and the US (TAXSIM).
Our main results are as follows. The inversion procedure shows that tax-bene￿t-revealed
social welfare functions for all countries display some taste for redistribution and do not system-
atically reject the assumption of Paretian governments. Yet the implicit social welfare function
is not always concave in Continental and Nordic Europe precisely because of the choice of
generous demogrant policies, which imply high e⁄ective taxation on the working poor. The
assumption that behavioral responses were by and large ignored by governments at the time
demogrant policies (means-tested social assistance programs) were implemented partly corrects
these inconsistencies. Interestingly, further corrections can be seen in recent years, mainly due
to the introduction of in-work support to the working poor. This possibly re￿ ects a change in
1preferences (towards more desert-sensitive redistribution) and/or a reassessment of behavioral
responses (elasticities that policy advisors have in mind may well have come closer to "true"
elasticities, i.e., those recovered by econometric estimations in recent years). With these elastic-
ities we ￿nd that international heterogeneity in work-consumption preferences plays some role
￿yet our results essentially show that di⁄erences in the degree of inequality aversion are sig-
ni￿cant only across broad groups of countries. Revealed inequality aversion is consistent with
direct evidence on citizens￿redistributive views when comparing the US and Continental and
Nordic Europe.1
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y reviews the related literature. Section 3
presents the optimal tax model of Saez (2002) and the inversion procedure. Section 4 describes
the empirical labor supply model. Section 5 presents the main elements of the empirical imple-
mentation (data, selection, estimated labor supply elasticities). Section 6 brie￿ y describes the
redistributive and incentive potentials of national tax-bene￿t systems and discusses the results
of the revealed social preferences analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The normative literature of the 1970s, following the seminal contribution of Mirrlees (1971),
had remained mostly theoretical due to the lack of reliable information on the ￿ true￿distribu-
tion of individual abilities. More recently, the increasing availability of representative household
datasets has allowed implementing Mirrlees￿model to question the optimality of actual tax-
bene￿t systems (e.g., in Diamond, 1998, Saez, 2001, 2002). In particular, some authors have
focused on how generous welfare schemes (and con￿scatory implicit taxation) at the bottom
of the distribution could be grounded on the basis of optimal tax formulas in some European
countries (see Diamond, 1998, ChonØ and Laroque, 2005). Overall, however, empirical applica-
tions remain scarce because little is known about the two fundamental primitives of the model ￿
which are directly related to e¢ ciency and equity concerns ￿namely labor supply behavior and
social preferences, respectively. In most applications some "plausible" assumptions are made for
both components. We brie￿ y review the relevant literature for each of them.
2.1 Social Preferences
For social preferences, available studies typically choose reasonable levels of social inequality
aversion to characterize optimal tax schedules. In the primal problem it is possible to verify
which degree of inequality aversion makes the optimal schedule closest to the actual one. Hence,
the representation of redistributive preferences for a country at a certain point in time can
itself become the object of investigation. In fact, the inverse optimal problem allows directly
1In a similar spirit, the inversion approach is used by Gordon and Cullen (2011) to recover the degree of
redistribution by the federal state in the US and migration elasticities across states that are implicit in the
observed e⁄ective net tax schedules. Linking tax-implicit preferences with direct evidence on people￿ s ethical
view is suggested in our analysis and relates to other studies focused on redistributive preferences (e.g., Corneo
and Fong, 2008), comparisons between tax preferences and actual tax schedules (Singhal, 2008) or more causal
explanations on generosity di⁄erences across welfare states (Algan et al., 2011).
2recovering the redistributive preferences implicit in actual policies. This dual approach was ￿rst
suggested in the context of optimal commodity taxation (see Decoster and Schokkaert, 1989,
for an application and additional references). It has been extended to the Mirrlees￿income tax
problem by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2010) who characterize the properties of the tax-revealed
social welfare function and provide an illustration on French data. In particular, they check
whether revealed social welfare functions pass minimum consistency checks (i.e., are compatible
with the ￿ction of an optimizing Paretian planner). We apply this approach in a systematic way
to characterize the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄in many European countries and the US.2 However,
instead of relying on ￿ reasonable￿labor supply elasticities taken from the literature, we estimate
country-speci￿c elasticities which are consistent with Saez￿optimal tax model and based on the
same micro data. A parallel and independent study by Blundell et al. (2009) follows the same
approach but focuses on single mothers in Germany and the UK. Our analysis covers a much
larger number of countries, providing a broader pictures of the potential contrasts in tax-revealed
social preferences, notably between Continental Europe and the US. Furthermore, we provide
additional results and alternative explanations of cross-country di⁄erences.
2.2 Labor Supply Elasticities
Optimal tax applications most often refer to plausible elasticities drawn from the labor supply
literature. However, even if a relative consensus has been reached on certain aspects, notably
that wage elasticities of labor supply are positive, usually smaller than 1 and larger for married
women (Blundell and Macurdy, 1999), there is little agreement on their magnitude or how they
di⁄er across countries. Even within a country, the size of elasticities can vary greatly depending
on the period of investigation or various methodological aspects (see Evers et al., 2008, Bargain
et al., 2011). Our attempt in this paper is to capture the labor supply responses that are
consistent with the same microdata used for optimal tax characterization and estimated in a
comparable manner for all countries. In this way, our work completes Immervoll et al. (2007),
who compare tax-bene￿t systems across countries using "reasonable" labor supply estimates
and sensitivity analysis about plausible di⁄erences across countries. These authors suggest an
interesting measure of the e¢ ciency cost of marginal transfers from the rich to the poor in 15
EU countries. Under their assumptions of neutral redistributive preferences, and with uniform
elasticities across countries, further redistribution to the workless poor would imply very large
e¢ ciency losses in some countries. If governments are ready to bear such costs, this must re￿ ect
highly Rawlsian redistributive views. We directly characterize these potential di⁄erences in
(tax-bene￿t revealed) social preferences, while using estimated work-consumption preferences.
Extensive versus Intensive Margins. A well-known problem with the Mirrlees￿model is
that it accounts only for behavioral responses at the intensive margin. The crucial role of the
extensive margin, i.e., changes in participation decisions, has been recognized in the optimal
2An ancestor of the present paper, Bargain and Spadaro (2008), and a follow-up available as Spadaro (2008),
di⁄er from what we do here in many respects. In particular, the present paper integrates optimal tax analysis
with own labor supply estimations for each country and extends the analysis to a large set of countries ￿including
the US, among others.
3tax literature at least since Diamond (1980). Explicitly incorporating participation decisions
is also important empirically, since this margin is probably the main channel of labor supply
adjustments (Heckman, 1993). For this reason it is often suspected that responsiveness is larger
among low income groups, which fundamentally a⁄ect welfare analyses. In particular, Eissa et
al. (2008) show that normative conclusions of policy evaluations in the US completely change
when recognizing that participation elasticities can be signi￿cantly larger in lower part of the
distribution. As is made clear in Immervoll et al. (2007), this particularly a⁄ects the debate
about whether redistribution should be directed to the workless poor (through traditional de-
mogrant policies ) or to the working poor (via in-work support). This point is also central
to our analysis, as we illustrate how the policy choices made by past governments in Conti-
nental/Nordic Europe may reveal little desert-sensitive redistributive preferences together with
extreme underestimations of participation elasticities. For a comprehensive characterization, we
adopt the discrete version of the optimal tax model by Saez (2002), in which the population is
partitioned into income groups. This simpli￿cation allows both intensive and extensive margins
to be incorporated relatively easily. In our empirical analysis, labor supply behavior is estimated
at the individual level and then used to calculate elasticities along both margins at the income
group level. The present paper provides novel evidence about labor supply responsiveness along
the income distribution (to our knowledge, there is only suggestive evidence based on extensions
of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for single mothers, e.g., Eissa and Liebman, 1996, and
few estimates from structural models as explained below).
Single Individuals. We restrict our analysis to a homogenous group of the population, just
like Blundell et al. (2009) who focus on single mothers. However, we choose a di⁄erent group
for two reasons. First, from a practical point of view, sample sizes of single mothers would
be too small to obtain robust results for most countries. Second and more important, policies
aiming at single mothers may also be inspired by non-welfarist objectives such as minimizing
child poverty. Saez (2002)￿ s (welfarist) optimal tax framework is not appropriate in this case.
Therefore, we prefer to look at childless single individuals in order to extract the vertical equity
concerns incorporated in tax-bene￿t regimes. Despite the large increase in the number of single
individuals over the last few decades, the labor supply behavior of childless single men and women
has received relatively little attention. Part of this is due to the fact that changes in tax and
welfare policies, used in recent studies to measure labor supply responsiveness, have essentially
concerned families with children.3 To our knowledge, only a few studies report estimates for
childless singles, often based on the estimation of structural models with tax-bene￿t simulations.
For Italy, the Netherlands and Germany, Aaberge et al. (2002), Euwals and van Soest (1999)
and Bargain et al. (2009) report wage elasticities for childless single individuals of around :08,
:03 ￿ :18 and :1 ￿ :2 respectively. Bishop et al. (2009) study all single women over a long
period (1979-2003) in the US, using a simple estimation of hours and participation on repeated
cross-sections. Their study reports small elasticities and, more speci￿cally, a signi￿cant decline
3This explains why the labor supply of single mothers has received a greater coverage. This literature has
typically focused on the responses to changes in welfare programs in the US and the UK (see for instance Eissa
and Liebman, 1996, using changes in the EITC, and the survey of Hotz and Scholz, 2003). Lone parents comprise
only a small fraction of all single individuals, however, even if it is important for welfare considerations.
4in wage elasticities for childless women (from :24 to :13). The limited evidence available thus
points to weak labor supply responsiveness of childless singles, at least compared to married
women and single mothers. Yet, these studies often ignore the heterogeneity that may exist
among single people and, as stressed above, the crucial point that low-wage singles may show
more responsiveness on the extensive margin. We are aware of only two studies which provide
detailed estimates, using structural models with taxation. For the UK, Meghir and Phillips
(2008) report a participation wage elasticity of :27 for unskilled single men and of zero for those
with college education. For Italy, Aaberge et al. (2002) report participation elasticities as high
as :5 for single men in the lower part of the income distribution and almost zero higher up.
3 Theoretical Background
3.1 The Optimal Tax Model
The model of Saez (2002) is based on the standard, Mirrlees optimal income tax framework.
That is, a Paretian government is assumed to maximize a social welfare function subject to an
e¢ ciency constraint and a national budget constraint. This function aggregates individual utility
levels, which themselves depend on disposable household income (equivalent to consumption
in a static framework) and leisure. The form of the social welfare function characterizes the
government￿ s taste for redistribution, ranging from Rawlsian preferences, where the government
cares only about the worst-o⁄ individual, to utilitarian preferences, where all individuals are
weighted equally. Actual productivity is not observed, so that the government can only rely
on second-best taxation based on income. The e¢ ciency constraint, or incentive-compatibility
constraint, states that agents modify their labor supply, and hence their taxable income, in
response to the level of e⁄ective taxation.
Saez (2002) assumes that potential workers can be aggregated into I + 1 discrete groups
comprising I groups of individuals who work, ranked by increasing gross income levels Yi (i =
1;:::I), and a group i = 0 of non-workers. For each level of market income Yi, there is a
corresponding level of disposable income Ci = Yi ￿ Ti, where Ti is the e⁄ective tax paid by
group i (it is e⁄ective in the sense that it includes all taxes and social contributions, minus all
transfers). Non-workers may receive a negative tax, i.e., a positive transfer ￿T0, identical to C0
by de￿nition, and often referred to as a demogrant policy (minimum income, social assistance,
etc.). Proportion hi measures the share of group i in the population. With this discretized














for i = 1;:::;I; (1)
with ￿i and ￿i the elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins respectively, and gi the
set of marginal social welfare weights assigned by the government to groups i = 0;:::;I. Note
that
Ti￿Ti￿1









Yi￿Yi￿1 the e⁄ective "marginal" tax rate (EMTR) faced by group i. It is not exactly
marginal in the usual sense, but is de￿ned at the income group level. Formula (1) is very
comparable to the usual Mirrlees￿rule. In particular, the level of marginal taxation is inversely
5related to the size of the group and the intensive margin elasticity ￿i. A noticeable di⁄erence,
however, is the presence of the extensive margin elasticity ￿i (see Diamond, 1980). Importantly
for our analysis of actual tax-bene￿t system, if it tends to zero, the model is simply a discrete
version of Mirrlees and negative marginal tax rates resulting from in-work support ￿such as the
US EITC ￿are never optimal, since they discourage productive workers at the intensive margin.
However, the larger the extensive elasticity, the more likely are optimal schedules featuring
smaller guaranteed income for non-workers and larger in-work support (and possibly negative
marginal taxes at low income levels, see Saez, 2002, ChonØ and Laroque, 2005).
Note also that the de￿nitions of the elasticities at the intensive and extensive margins are













The former captures the percentage increase in group i when Ci ￿ Ci￿1 is increased by 1%,
and is de￿ned under the assumption that individuals are restricted to adjust their labor supply
to the neighboring choice. The latter, the extensive or participation elasticity, is de￿ned as
the percentage of individuals in group i who stop working when the di⁄erence between the
disposable income out of work and at earnings point i is reduced by 1%. These elasticities are
notably di⁄erent from the traditional wage-elasticity of hours (participation) which are de￿ned
as the increase in working time (participation rate) when wage rates increase by 1%.
In expression (1) social preferences are summarized by the set of weights gi. These weights
mingle the ￿primitive￿social weight, i.e., the derivative of the implicit social welfare function
integrated over all the workers within group i, and the individuals￿marginal utility of income
(theoretical models often rely on quasi-linear preferences, e.g., in Saez, 2001, so the latter is equal
to 1). Hence, as argued by Saez (2002), these weights provide a more direct and transparent
interpretation than the primitive weights and are preferably the object of our attention. Indeed,
they represent the (per capita) marginal social welfare of transferring one euro to an individual
in group i, expressed in terms of public funds. Given this de￿nition, the Saez model does not
require the speci￿cation of utility functions, since the marginal utility of income is incorporated
in gi. The only assumption made on preferences is that there is no income e⁄ect ￿a traditional
restriction in this literature ￿which is supported by our empirical results as discussed below.4
When income e⁄ects are ruled out, an additional constraint emerges from the Saez model which
normalizes weights as follows:
X
i
higi = 1: (4)
4In the empirical part we choose a ￿ exible utility function to estimate labor supply elasticities (see also
robustness checks in Appendix B). Zero income e⁄ect is not imposed a priori in our estimation but checked
a posteriori. We ￿nd small or insigni￿cant e⁄ects, so that the assumption made here is acceptable as a ￿rst
approximation.
63.2 Retrieving the Marginal Social Welfare Weights
The inverse optimal tax problem is relatively straightforward (see also Bourguignon and Spadaro,
2010). Rather than retrieving the optimal tax schedule under certain assumptions about elas-
ticities and social preferences, we invert formula (1) to infer weights gi from the knowledge of
income levels Yi (from the data), tax levels Ti (or disposable incomes Ci = Yi ￿ Ti, obtained
by microsimulation) and elasticities (obtained by econometric estimations on the same data).
More precisely, expression (1) directly gives the weight on the last group:







From equation (5) weights gI￿1 to g1 for groups i = 1;:::;I ￿1 can be derived recursively using:


















The weight g0 for the group of non-workers is obtained using normalization (4). Weights gi
correspond in part to the marginal social welfare function in the continuous model ￿ la Mirrlees.
Therefore, a necessary condition for the implicit social welfare function to be Paretian, i.e. non-
decreasing at all productivity levels, is that weights are positive. We shall check this property
in our empirical results. Note that both the behavioral elasticities ￿i and ￿i and the group sizes
hi are endogenous to the tax-bene￿t system. This means that the proportions hi observed in
the data and the elasticities estimated on the same data cannot be used to derive the optimal
tax-bene￿t schedule in Saez￿primal problem. Yet they can be used in the dual approach retained
here as the actual schedule is assumed to verify the optimality rule (1).5
4 Labor Supply Estimation
4.1 Methodological Issues
A contribution of the present paper is to estimate, for a large number of countries, the behavioral
elasticities ￿i and ￿i which are consistent with the data, i.e., the distribution of gross and net
incomes Yi and Ci used to recover tax-bene￿t-revealed social preferences. Ideally, we would
like to use a generally agreed-upon standard estimation approach that also allows comparable
elasticity measures across countries. There is no consensus on this matter, however. Estimates
of continuous labor supply models, i.e., the Hausman approach, are often contaminated by
5Think of a no-tax initial scenario: the social planner sets tax rates optimally according to (1) and to the
values of parameters ￿i, ￿i, hi that prevail in the no-tax situation. Agents would then respond to this policy, so
that elasticities and group sizes (in particular the number of non-workers) would change. This in turn invalidates
equation (1), i.e., tax levels are no longer optimal, and the optimal tax rule must be applied again, generating
further responses, etc. Clearly, it must be assumed that at least one ￿xed point exists in which the left and right-
hand sides of equation (1) are consistent. When using population shares and elasticities estimated on actual data,
the actual tax-bene￿t system as deemed optimal is precisely such a ￿xed point. Note that using the primal problem
to derive optimal tax schedules from labor supply estimations would require a model in which tax formulas are
based directly on utility functions rather than (endogenous) summary elasticity measures. Interesting attempts
are suggested by Blundell and Shephard (2008) and Aarberge and Columbino (2008).
7measurement errors and by assuming wage exogeneity. That is, unobserved characteristics (e.g.,
being hard-working) in￿ uence both wages and work preferences so that estimates obtained from
cross-sectional wage variation across individuals are potentially biased. Recent practice has
focused on natural experiments, and notably changes in tax-bene￿t regulations, which can be
used to assess labor supply responsiveness in a more robust way as reforms provide exogenous
variations in net wages. Obviously, no such reform can be found to estimate labor supply
elasticities in a comparable way across many di⁄erent countries. Hence, we opt for a ￿ exible
discrete-choice model, as used in well-known labor supply studies for Europe (van Soest, 1995,
Blundell et al., 2000) or the US (Hoynes, 1996, Eissa and Hoynes, 2004). With this approach,
it is easy to account for the complete e⁄ect of of tax-bene￿t policies on household budgets, and
identi￿cation is partly obtained by nonlinearities and discontinuities caused by these policies,
as discussed below. This method also requires the explicit parameterization of consumption-
leisure preferences as it assumes that labor supply decisions can be reduced to choosing among
a discrete set of possibilities (e.g., inactivity, part-time and full-time). Thus, there is no need
to restrict preferences and, in particular, to impose their convexity. We nonetheless check the
e⁄ect of choosing di⁄erent speci￿cations for the utility function. Discrete models also account
directly for both participation and working-time decisions (non-participation is just one of the
discrete options), which is important, as motivated in the previous section. The main potential
drawback is the fact that in this approach the number of hour choices is typically limited to
commonly agreed durations of work in order to maintain computational feasibility. We shall
check whether moving closer to the continuous case a⁄ects the estimated elasticities (see also
Heim, 2009).
4.2 The Empirical Model
Speci￿cation. We essentially follow van Soest (1995), Hoynes (1996) and Blundell et al.
(2000) and refer to these studies for more technical details. We specify consumption-leisure
preferences using a quadratic utility function, i.e., the utility of household k choosing the discrete
choice j = 1;:::;J can be written as:
Ukj = Vkj(ckj;hkj) + ￿kj (7)
with Vkj(ckj;hkj) = ￿ckckj + ￿ccc2
kj + ￿hkhkj + ￿hhh2
kj + ￿chckjhkj ￿ fkj; (8)
with household consumption ckj and worked hours hkj. In the deterministic utility Vkj, coef-
￿cients on consumption and worked hours ￿￿ck and ￿hk ￿are household-speci￿c as they vary
linearly with several taste-shifters (gender, polynomial form of age, region) and incorporate
random components (so the model allows for unobserved heterogeneity and unrestricted substi-
tution patterns between alternatives). The ￿t is improved by the introduction of ￿xed costs of
work fkj, as in Blundell et al. (2000), equal to zero if j = 1 (inactivity) and non-zero for j > 1.
They essentially capture the fact that there are very few observations with a small positive
number of working hours. These costs also depend on observed characteristics, including region
and education level, which may proxy possible di⁄erences in job search costs, as suggested by
van Soest and Das (2000). Note that ￿xed costs are only parametrically identi￿ed, i.e., a very
￿ exible utility function could pick up the gap in the distribution at few hours (see van Soest
8et al., 2001). This militates in favor of relaxing usual regularity conditions on leisure/labor
supply (see Heim and Meyer, 2003). More generally, as we specify utility directly and not a
labor supply function, tangency conditions are not required, and hence we simply check quasi-
concavity of the utility function a posteriori. The only restriction to our model is the imposition
of increasing monotonicity in consumption, which seems a minimum requirement for meaningful
interpretation and policy analysis. For each hour choice j, disposable income is calculated as a
function ckj = d(wkhkj; mk) of labor income wkhkj and non-labor income mk. The tax-bene￿t
function d is simulated using calculators, which we present in the next section. Wages wk are
predicted using calculated wage rates from data information on workers and Heckman-corrected
wage estimations. The deterministic utility is completed by i.i.d. error terms ￿ij for each choice
assumed to represent possible observational errors, optimization errors or transitory situations.
Under the assumption that error terms follow an extreme value type I (EV-I) distribution, the
(conditional) probability for each household of choosing a given alternative has an explicit an-
alytical solution (a logistic function of deterministic utilities at all choices). The unconditional
probability is obtained by integrating out the disturbance terms (unobserved heterogeneity and
the wage error term) in the likelihood. In practice, the model is estimated by maximizing the
simulated likelihood function, which is done by averaging the conditional probability over quasi
random draws (r = 100) generated by Halton sequences, as suggested by Train (2003).6
Identi￿cation. First of all, we predict wages for all observations, as explained above, in order
to reduce some of the bias due to measurement errors on wages stemming from the division
bias. In addition, accounting fully for tax-bene￿t policies helps to create some variation in net
wage between people with the same gross wage. That is, individuals face di⁄erent e⁄ective tax
schedules, i.e., di⁄erent actual marginal tax rates or bene￿t withdrawal rates, because of their
di⁄erent circumstances (disability status, age, family compositions, home-ownership status) or
di⁄erent levels of non-labor income. Using nonlinearities and discontinuities generated by the
tax-bene￿t system in this way is a frequent identi￿cation strategy in the empirical literature
based on static discrete models and cross-sectional data (see van Soest, 1995, Blundell et al.
2000). Furthermore, we bene￿t here from some time and spatial variation that can produce
additional exogenous variations in net wages. For seven countries, we dispose of two years of
data. The three-year interval between the two corresponding tax-bene￿t systems, 1998 and
2001, gives us some guarantee that enough exogenous changes in tax-bene￿t policies occurred
over time. For most countries, we also have regional variation in tax-bene￿t rules and, hence, in
net wages. This source of identi￿cation has been extensively used in the US (variations across
states in the income tax code, in bene￿ts rules and the EITC are used in labor supply studies,
e.g., Hoynes, 1996, Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001, and Eissa and Hoynes, 2004). For EU member
states, housing bene￿ts vary in almost all countries at the municipality or county level, taking
6We also insist on the fact that the two-stage approach used here is common practice (see Creedy and Kalb,
2005). Simultaneous estimations of wages and labor supply seem the ideal approach, yet this approach is rarely
adopted (among exceptions, see Laroque and SalaniØ, 2001). The reason is that tax-bene￿t simulations must be
run at each iteration of the ML estimation, which requires that they are available in the same computer language
(this is not the case with the tax simulator EUROMOD) and which also takes more time (which would not be
feasible given the large number of countries we are dealing with).
9into account local di⁄erences in housing costs (exceptions are Belgium, Italy, Portugal and
Spain). In Estonia, Hungary and Poland, local governments provide di⁄erent supplements to
almost all bene￿ts, including child bene￿t/allowance and social assistance. Regional variation
in the latter also exists in Denmark, Germany, Italy and Spain. In addition, taxation often
varies locally.7 The tax-bene￿t simulators at use and demographic information in our datasets
allow us to account for all these di⁄erences across households in our sample. We believe that
the present approach constitutes a reasonable trade-o⁄ between comparability attempt and a
reasonable identi￿cation strategy on cross-sectional data (see also Bargain et al., 2011).
Elasticities. In the present nonlinear model, labor supply elasticities cannot be derived ana-
lytically but are calculated by numerical simulations using the estimated model. For standard
wage (income) elasticities at the individual level, we simply predict changes in labor supply
following a marginal uniform increase in wage rates (non-labor income). We have checked that
results are similar when wage elasticities are calculated by simulating either a 1% or a 10%
increase in gross wages (unearned incomes). We follow a calibration method which is consistent
with the probabilistic nature of the model at the individual level. For each household, we re-
peatedly draw a set of J +1 random terms from an EV-I distribution (together with unobserved
heterogeneity terms of the model), which generate a perfect match between predicted and ob-
served choices. The same draws are kept when predicting labor supply responses to an increase
in wages or non-labor income. Averaging individual responses over a large number of draws
provides robust transition matrices. The particular elasticities used in the optimal tax model, ￿i
and ￿i, make it necessary to translate the individual responses among hour categories to changes
among income groups. To do so, we aggregate individual responses at the income group level for
non-marginal changes in disposable income, according to de￿nitions in expressions (2) and (3).
A similar procedure is used in Blundell et al. (2009). Standard errors are obtained by repeated
random draws of the preference parameters from their estimated distributions and by applying
the calibration procedure for each draw.
Limitations. Our estimations follow the bulk of the literature in that we ignore response
margins other than labor supply. As usually done in the literature, we assume full bene￿t take-
up. More re￿ned estimations accounting for the stigma of welfare program participation would
require precise data information on actual receipt of bene￿ts, which is not always available or
reliable in interview-based surveys (see Blundell et al., 2000). We also assume full tax com-
pliance and ignore migration in the behavioral model. This is certainly acceptable as a ￿rst
approximation, especially as we focused on workers (and excluded capitalists), so that taxable
7County and municipality ￿ at taxes in Nordic countries can vary substantially (ex: 22:8￿27:8% in Denmark;
16:5 ￿ 21% in Finland; 29 ￿ 36% in Sweden). Regional variations in church tax rates are signi￿cant in Finland
and Germany. Note that the mere choice of paying church tax is also a relatively exogenous variation across
individuals in all countries which have it. Social insurance contributions can vary by region (e.g., in Germany).
Other regional variation exists and concerns tax rates (the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain via imputed rents),
tax credits (Belgium), tax deductions (Italy) and council taxes (the UK). Note that for the EU, information on
tax-bene￿t rules for each country is available at: www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod (together with modeling
choices and validation of EUROMOD). For the US, tax-bene￿t rules (and TAXSIM) are presented in detail at
www.nber.org/~taxsim/.
10income essentially coincides with labor income. While it is suspected that top earners react
along di⁄erent margins, such as investment in human capital, migration or tax evasion, Saez
(2004) shows that this is concentrated at the very top (1%) of the distribution. Also, the optimal
tax framework is usually not equipped to deal with these dynamic issues (an exception is Simula
and Trannoy, 2006, on tax emigration) and hardly any empirical evidence exists on the extent
of these e⁄ects. We have also assumed that fertility and marital status are ￿xed. Even if it
is likely that social systems in￿ uences behavior in this respect (see, e.g., Hoynes, 1996), those
kind of adjustments are di¢ cult to incorporate in an optimal tax framework and evidence on
the precise reactions is again rare and mixed.
5 Empirical Implementation
5.1 Data and Tax-Bene￿t Simulations
We aim to replicate the analysis for a large panel of countries that re￿ ect a variety of welfare
regimes and possibly contrasting labor supply elasticities. We use datasets, for the US, 14
EU states prior to May 1st, 2004 (the so-called EU-15 except Luxembourg) and three new
member states (NMS) ￿Estonia, Hungary and Poland. The di⁄erent datasets used respect the
basic requirements for our exercise, i.e., they provide a representative sample of the population
(and in particular of income distributions), with comparable variable de￿nitions across countries
and all the necessary information on income and socio-demographics to estimate labor supply
behavior.
The fundamental information required by the optimal tax model is the e⁄ective tax Ti =
Yi ￿ Ci, which is the aggregation of all direct taxes and transfers in a given income group.
To avoid errors on the reporting of taxes paid or transfers received as often encountered in
household microdata, we simulate as precisely as possible the amount of bene￿ts each household
is entitled to and the taxes and social contributions it should pay, and hence its actual level
of disposable income, then aggregate disposable income to obtain Ci for each income group
i = 0;:::;I. Tax-bene￿t simulations are also necessary for the labor supply estimations. Indeed,
for each household k in each country, we calculate the level of disposable income ckj at each
choice j in order to proceed with the estimation of the discrete model as explained above. Tax-
bene￿t simulations are performed as follows. For Europe we use EUROMOD, a tax-bene￿t
calculator designed to simulate the redistributive systems of the EU-15 as well as several NMS.
This is a unique tool to obtain a complete picture of the redistribution and the incentives to
work generated by European welfare regimes. An introduction to EUROMOD, a descriptive
analysis of taxes and transfers in the EU member states and robustness checks are provided
by Sutherland (2001) and Immervoll (2004). EUROMOD has been used in several empirical
studies, notably in the comparison of European welfare regimes by Immervoll et al. (2007,
2011). For the US, tax-bene￿t calculations are conducted using TAXSIM (version v9), the
NBER calculator presented in Feenberg and Coutts (1993) and augmented by simulations of
social transfers. It has been used in combination with Current Population Survey (CPS) data
in several applications (e.g, Eissa et al., 2008, or Eissa and Hoynes, 2011).
The datasets at use are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 (third row). These household
11surveys have been assembled within the framework of the EUROMOD project for the EU-15,
and combined with tax-bene￿t simulations for years 1998, 2001 or both. For the NMS, data were
collected for the year 2005, and policies simulated for that year, in a more recent development
of the EUROMOD project.8 For the US, we use the 2006 IPUMS version (Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series) of the CPS, which contains information for the year 2005.
The data selection is as follows. We extract samples of potential salary workers aged 18 to 64,
excluding pensioners, student, farmers and the self-employed. To keep up with the logic of the
optimal tax model, we exclude all households where capital income represents more than 25%
of the total gross income. Most importantly, we focus on childless single men and women. This
restricts the scope of the analysis, but we show in the results section that redistribution analyses
conducted on single individuals re￿ ect a large share of the di⁄erences in redistributive potentials
across selected countries. This selection was necessary, and a reasonable choice to make, for
at least two reasons. Firstly, aggregating di⁄erent demographic groups within a social welfare
function poses fundamental di¢ culties in terms of interpersonal comparisons (see attempts in
Aaberge and Colombino. 2008).9 Focusing on one homogenous demographic group at a time
￿here childless singles ￿implicitly assumes some separability in the social planner￿ s program,
with a ￿rst stage redistribution between demographic groups and a second stage with vertical
redistribution within homogenous groups (see Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2010). Secondly, it
is not at all clear which labor supply elasticities should be used if couples were to be included
in the analysis. Immervoll et al. (2007) allocate di⁄erent elasticities to di⁄erent demographic
groups but ignore the issue of joint labor supply decision in couples. As in Blundell et al. (2009),
we prefer to focus on one-adult households.
5.2 Income Groups and Income Concepts
We partition the population of each country into a small number of groups, I+1 = 6, in order to
ease cross-country comparisons. In our baseline, group 0 is composed of inactive individuals who
report neither labor income nor replacement income (such as unemployment bene￿t). Indeed,
contributory bene￿ts can be seen as pure insurance in most countries, where payments are
closely linked to workers￿past earnings through social security contributions (SSC). For that
reason, we interpret unemployment bene￿ts (UB) as delayed salaries and treat them stricto
sensus as replacement incomes, i.e., those who receive this insurance are treated as workers
in our baseline.10 In our view it would not make much sense to mix in group 0 high-skilled
8Note that we make use of those policy years available in EUROMOD at the time of writing (1998, 2001
or 2005, as indicated above). For comparison, we use TAXSIM simulations for the year 2005. Hopefully, future
developments of the EUROMOD project will allow extending our results to more recent data (and more countries).
9Even if (well-behaved) money metric utility measures could be derived to express household welfare in a
meaningful common unit ￿ which is far from obvious in the current state of the art ￿ the proper equivalence
scale to use is unknown. Indeed, this would be the one used by the social planner herself and not any arbitrary
scale that would impose some re-ranking and bias measures of vertical equity (see Lambert and Ramos, 1997).
Muellbauer and van de Ven (2004) retrieve implicit equivalence scales embodied in actual tax-bene￿t systems.
Along this line, one could consider inverting the optimal tax model on a heterogeneous population in order to
retrieve both implicit equivalence scales and social welfare weights. This sounds challenging but is not impossible.
10This is also consistent with the pure supply-side logic of the optimal tax model, in which involuntary unem-
ployment is ignored and job seekers who claim bene￿ts are treated as (potential) workers. For explicit introduction
12workers who receive high levels of UB (when replacement rates are very high, as in Nordic
countries) together with low-skilled workers who live on welfare (social assistance). We make
some exceptions to this treatment, however, in the case of, Ireland, Poland and the UK. For
these countries, UB are paid according to ￿ at rates and have no strong link to past contributions,
hence are treated as redistribution.11 Next, groups i = 1;:::;I are simply calculated as income
quintiles among workers. In Appendix B we show that results are not too sensitive to alternative
choices regarding the treatment of UB recipients and the de￿nitions of income groups.
The descriptive statistics of our selected sample are reported in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the
Appendix. Since the selected population is relatively homogenous by de￿nition, we do not report
usual demographic characteristics and essentially focus on the characteristics of the discretized
income groups ￿the main ingredients of the model ￿including group shares hi, average levels
of gross income Yi and disposable income Ci for each group i = 0;:::I, and e⁄ective ￿marginal￿
tax rates T0
i as de￿ned above. The redistributive and incentive characteristics of each national
system as captured in these tables are commented extensively in the section on results.
5.3 Labor Supply Elasticities
In our baseline labor supply model, we make use of a discretization with J = 7 choices, from
0 to 60 hours/week with a step of 10 hours. This allows us to capture as much as possible the
country-speci￿c variations in work hours. Nonetheless, we check alternative choice sets in the
robustness analysis (Appendix B). We ￿rst comment on estimations and the model ￿t, then turn
to the estimated elasticities.
Estimates and Fit. Estimates are broadly in line with usual ￿ndings, in that taste shifters
related to age most often display a parabolic pattern and are often, but not systematically,
signi￿cant.12 Costs of work are most often signi￿cantly positive. Higher education leads to
lower costs, which can be interpreted as lower job search costs for educated workers (see van
Soest and Das, 2001). Pseudo-R2 reported in Table A.3 (Appendix A) range from :15 in Sweden
to :36 in several countries. Yet they cannot be interpreted as standard R2 and a more meaningful
assessment consists of the comparison between observed and predicted choices. In Table A.3,
we see that the model ￿ts the data reasonably well, in the sense that predicted participation
rates and predicted mean hours according to the model are very similar to the ones observed in
the samples (the discrepancy is less than 5% in almost all cases). In addition, we represent the
complete hour distributions for the three cases with the largest discrepancies (Belgium 1998,
Ireland 1998 and Portugal 2001). Generally, di⁄erences in mean hours are due to discrepancies
between observed and predicted participation rates, as is the case for Ireland (Portugal) where
non-participation is overestimated (underestimated). In Belgium the discrepancies are due to
the model not being able to reproduce the hours distribution completely. In general, the model
of involuntary unemployment and search decisions in an optimal tax model, see Boone and Bovenberg (2004).
11In fact, the treatment of unemployment insurance has little e⁄ect for these countries since, for singles, pay-
ments of UB are very similar to levels of income support. Non-contributory social transfers and contributory UB
are described in Tables A.6, A.7 and A.8 in the Appendix and commented in the next section.
12For lack of space, we do not report detailed tables of estimated preference parameters for the 18 countries
under study. They are available from the authors on request (see also Bargain et al., 2011).
13does not predict the bunching of hours at 40 hours per week very well, which is a common
problem with ￿tting this type of model to data on weekly hours worked (see Euwals and van
Soest, 1999, for example). We can see that the 30 hours/week option and, to a lesser extent,
the overtime option (50 hours/week) are slightly overpredicted, even in cases where the ￿t is
very good (we provide an illustration for France 2001). Since most of the response to ￿nancial
incentives occurs at the extensive margin, a satisfying ￿t in terms of participation rates is the
most important aspect for our analysis.
Traditional Elasticities. We ￿rst produce standard income and wage elasticities ￿de￿ned
as change in hours or participation for marginal changes in unearned incomes or wage rates. We
aim at checking and comparing the results with the existing literature, noticing however that
evidence for single men and women is relatively limited, as recalled above (see Bargain et al.,
2011, for a complete comparison). Mean elasticities are reported in the upper panels of Tables
A.4 and A.5 (Appendix A). Wage elasticities of hours and participation are in line with recent
evidence based on discrete choice models. Elasticities are particularly small in France (see Evers
et al., 2008), the Netherlands (see Euwals and van Soest, 1999) as well as in Austria, Denmark,
Hungary, Poland and Portugal (countries for which we are not aware of any available results
for single individuals, except Bargain et al., 2011). They are especially large in Ireland (as
supported by Callan et al., 2009), Italy (see Aaberge et al., 2002) and Spain. Other countries
show intermediary values, which correspond to small elasticities around :1 ￿:2, for instance in
Germany (see also Haan and Steiner, 2006). Hour elasticities, which incorporate both change
in hours for those in work and participation e⁄ects, are close to participation elasticites, which
conveys that most of the total hour adjustment occurs at the extensive margin (a usual result
in the literature on couples￿labor supply). Income elasticities are found to be very small in all
countries, often not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero (Denmark, Italy) and systematically smaller
than :1 in absolute value. Only a few countries show signi￿cant elasticities between :02 and :06
(Hungary, Ireland, Sweden). The elasticities for the remaining countries are smaller than :01.
Ignoring income e⁄ects in the theoretical model and for the selected population is therefore a
reasonable approximation.
Saez Elasticities. Saez elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins, ￿i and ￿i, are
reported in the lower panels of Tables A.4 and A.5 (Appendix A) for the income groups of workers
i = 1;:::;I, together with bootstrapped standard errors. For a more convenient comparison
across countries, point estimates are also shown in Figure 1 below. Given the speci￿c de￿nition
of these elasticities, we do not expect their magnitude to match exactly the standard wage
elasticities of hours and participation as discussed above. Yet the marked di⁄erences observed
across countries mirror previous results, in particular the larger elasticities at the extensive
margin in Ireland, Italy and Spain, in contrast to particularly small response in France, the
Netherlands, Portugal and the NMS. Importantly, as discussed above, most of the extensive
margin response is due to groups 1 and 2, the low income groups. Extensive responses then
tend to decrease with income levels. As in Blundell et al. (2009), we ￿nd that elasticities at the
intensive margin are much smaller than participation elasticities, except for group 1, for which
intensive and extensive elasticities are by de￿nition identical (see equations 2 and 3). Together
14with slightly larger elasticities for the last group, possibly due to backward-bending labor supply,
this yields a U-shaped average pattern over the di⁄erent quintiles. In Figure 2 we ￿rst provide
a visual comparison of extensive margin elasticities across countries, with mean elasticities over
income groups i ￿ 1 and con￿dence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors. Estimates
appear to be relatively precise in general, yet 95% con￿dence bounds can be as broad as :4￿:8
for Italy or :2 ￿ :5 for Ireland. As we shall see, this may a⁄ect the international comparability
of tax-bene￿t revealed social inequality aversion. The bottom graph simply compares Saez￿
participation elasticities with traditionally de￿ned elasticities. Even if the former are slightly
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Notes: This Figure represents estimated Saez' extensive and intensive margin elasticities for the five groups of workers (for group 1,
extensive and intensive margins are equal by definition).
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
Figure 1: Saez￿Elasticities at the Extensive/Intensive Margins (Point Estimates)
The Role of Tax-Bene￿t Policies on Elasticity Comparisons. Finally, we investigate
whether cross-country di⁄erences are genuine or are in fact due to existing tax-bene￿t systems
themselves (recall that elasticities are endogenous to tax-bene￿t policies). For simplicity, we
proceed with traditional wage elasticities of participation (detailed results for these checks are
available from the authors upon request). Since di⁄erent tax-bene￿t policies may a⁄ect the
gross wage increment di⁄erently, we numerically simulate e⁄ective marginal tax rates (EMTR)
and calculate elasticities when incrementing net wages by 1%. In this way, we cancel out dif-
ferences in EMTR across countries due to di⁄erent tax schedules or bene￿t withdrawal rates.
We ￿nd that cross-country variation is barely a⁄ected when accounting for di⁄erences in im-
plicit taxation of labor income (as expected, elasticities after a 1% increase in net wage are
slightly larger than our base elasticities). Since tax-bene￿t systems can also a⁄ect hours and
15*Saez' extensive margin elasticities averaged over income groups i=1,… ,I (point estimates) and 95% confidence intervals.









0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70













































































































































































Figure 2: Extensive Margin Elasticities: Comparisons
participation and, in this way, the size of elasticities, we have also simulated a scenario where
existing tax-bene￿t systems are withdrawn completely (or, alternatively, replaced by a uniform
￿ at tax system, which yields similar conclusions). As expected, given this radical reform, labor
supply increases while elasticities mechanically decrease in almost all countries. Importantly,
countries with larger responses in the baseline also tend to have larger responses in the no-tax-
bene￿t counterfactual situation. These results thus suggest that individual work-consumption
preferences are su¢ ciently heterogeneous between countries to explain signi￿cant di⁄erences in
e¢ ciency constraints (see again Bargain et al, 2011 for additional results).
6 Main Results
6.1 National Tax-Bene￿t Systems: An Overview
Before presenting the main results, we suggest a brief overview of the redistributive policies in the
countries under study. Tables A.6, A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A summarize the rules governing
taxes, contributions and transfers for working-age single individuals in the EU and the US. Our
aim is to show the diversity of situations that may, to some extent, reveal important di⁄erences
in political and normative views across countries. For that purpose we present a suggestive
characterization of the redistributive and incentive potentials of the di⁄erent tax-bene￿t systems.
Both dimensions will be integrated in the optimal tax approach that follows.
Redistributive E⁄ects. We consider the three main groups of policy instruments ￿bene￿ts,
SSC and taxes ￿and how they a⁄ect Gini coe¢ cients for each country. We could use decom-
position of inequality indices by income sources, but prefer a more visual check in Figure A.1
(Appendix A) by calculating the Gini for di⁄erent income concepts, starting from gross incomes
16then including gradually each of the policy instruments (incomes are equivalized by the modi￿ed
OECD scale).13 The percentage reduction in Gini coe¢ cients is mostly due to transfers.14 In
Continental and Nordic Europe, bene￿ts alone bring the Gini coe¢ cient below the :35 mark.
For these countries, redistribution to the poor through means-tested social assistance is sub-
stantial. In contrast, it is absent in Southern Europe and the US (with the exception of some
disability bene￿ts), at least when our selection of childless singles is considered. In some coun-
tries in the middle of the ranking, such as Ireland and the UK, bene￿ts (and non-contributory
income support in particular) also help to reduce considerably the initially high levels of market
income inequality. SSC levied on earnings (and sometimes on bene￿ts) are generally designed
as ￿ at-rate schemes and, hence, are relatively neutral in terms of redistribution. The e⁄ect of
income taxation is more important. Taxes naturally have a larger redistributive impact than
transfers in countries where the latter are small (e.g., Hungary or the US). They sometimes have
a signi￿cant role even when bene￿ts are generous (e.g., in Denmark). The degree of vertical
redistribution due to progressive income tax schedules depends on a complex mix of tax level,
tax progressivity and scope (tax base), as studied in Wagsta⁄et al. (1999). Low income usually
earners do not pay taxes thanks to tax allowances or tax-free brackets. International rankings
on the levels of public spending (and in particular spending on redistribution) mirror tax lev-
els, with lower taxation in Southern and Eastern Europe and the US at one end and high tax
redistribution in Nordic countries at the other.
Figure A.2 ￿rst plots the Gini-reduction e⁄ect of tax-bene￿t policies as previously de￿ned,
i.e., which include UB as part of the redistribution function, against the same e⁄ect when
UB are treated as market income. We see that the international ranking is broadly preserved
(corr = :91). That is, countries with high levels of redistribution through the tax-bene￿t system
alone also provide high replacement rates to the unemployed (the latter may make the system
even more redistributive than when mere tax-bene￿t policies are accounted for, for instance in
Denmark). As argued before, we shall treat UB as pure insurance in our main results in order to
be consistent with the logic of the optimal tax model. Figure A.2 also compares redistributive
e⁄ects in our selection of working-age childless singles with e⁄ects for the whole population. As
expected, more redistribution occurs in the latter because many transfers are available only for
families with children (or are more generous for these families), notably social assistance (e.g.,
TANF in the US) and in-work support (e.g., in-work transfers, such as the US EITC or the UK
WFTC). Interestingly, however, the ￿gure shows a high correlation (:90), i.e., countries which
do not redistribute much among childless single individuals do not redistribute much in general.
Thus, the views of each social planner in terms of vertical equity is well re￿ ected by the selected
group of single individuals, which is reassuring for the analysis that follows.
Incentive E⁄ects. Incentive e⁄ects of tax-bene￿t systems are summarized by EMTRs as
reported in Tables A.1 and A.2 (Appendix A) and compared graphically in Figure 3 below. To
13In Figure A.1, we report results only for childless single individuals. Additional results for the whole sample
show that Gini of disposable income are in line with common wisdom (notably Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997).
14This result holds whatever the order in which policy instruments are added to (or withdrawn from) gross
income. The order retained here is justi￿ed by the fact that bene￿ts are taxable in some countries (so that certain
combinations, such as gross income minus SSC and taxes, would lead to negative incomes).
17be consistent with the optimal tax model, EMTRs are calculated at the income group level,
i.e.,
Ti￿Ti￿1
Yi￿Yi￿1, as previously de￿ned. This is slightly di⁄erent from other studies which sometimes
de￿ne EMTRs at the individual level (e.g., Immervoll et al., 2007). Our characterization is
nonetheless very much in line with previous international comparisons (see Immervoll, 2004).
In Figure 3 the upper quadrants show that in Continental (left) and Nordic (right) European
countries, EMTRs are larger in upper income groups, due to progressive taxation. In addition,
they are particularly large for group 1 (and sometimes group 2). Such high implicit taxation
on poor workers is due to high withdrawal rates of means-tested social assistance programs
together with the absence of transfers to the working poor (they are excluded from any form
of redistribution for the years under consideration, with a few exceptions). Combining the
two factors explains a U-shaped pattern of EMTRs extensively discussed in the literature (e.g.,
Immervoll, 2004).15 The lower panels show EMTRs in Eastern European countries and Anglo-
Saxon countries (left) and Southern Europe (right). In contrast to Continental/Nordic Europe,
the overall level of net taxation is lower, and the distribution of EMTR ￿ atter, with a few
exceptions. This characterizes the absence of social assistance schemes in most of these countries.
In the US, and to some lesser extent in the UK and Ireland, redistribution is usually targeted to
those in-work and with children (hence it is not apparent in our results). Yet social assistance
(Income Support) in the UK is not marginal and also creates high implicit taxation among
low-wage workers, which is not compensated by tax credits in the case of childless singles for
the years under consideration. There are other exceptions on the income tax side, notably fairly
higher tax levels can be observed in some Eastern countries (Poland, Hungary) as well as in
Ireland and Italy. Tax progressivity is also more pronounced in the income tax schedule of
several Southern countries (Greece, Portugal, Italy).
6.2 Tax-Bene￿t Revealed Redistributive Preferences
We now move to our core results. The main set of results is shown in Figure 4 where we present,
for each country, the marginal social welfare weights gi for the six income groups i = 0;:::;5, as
derived from the inverse optimal tax approach and calculated on the basis of estimated labor
supply elasticities. Recall that each of these weights represents the dollar equivalent value for
governments of distributing an extra dollar uniformly to individuals working in group i. Notice
that while the patterns of welfare weights can be compared across countries, the exact magnitude
for each income group cannot be directly compared because the normalization (4) is country-
speci￿c. Blundell et al. (2009) suggest expressing all weights relatively to the weight of group
0. Given the large number of countries, our choice is to summarize the shape of redistributive
preferences in a single-valued index. To do so, we use the parameterization suggested by Saez
(2002) to relate weights and net incomes, i.e.:
gi = 1=(p ￿ Ci)￿ for all i = 0;:::;I: (9)
15Tables A.1 and A.2 also report e⁄ective participation tax rates (EPTR), de￿ned as
Ti￿T0
Yi￿Y0 for i = 1;:::;I.
They add to the picture that implicit taxation when leaving assistance and taking up a job on the labor market

























































Figure 3: E⁄ective Marginal Tax Rates
In this expression, p denotes the marginal value of public funds and ￿ is a scalar parameter
re￿ ecting the social aversion to inequality. The higher ￿ the more pro-redistribution social
preferences are, from ￿ = 0 (utilitarian preferences) to ￿ = +1 (the Rawlsian criterion). In
practice, Saez (2002) states that ￿ values around :25 (1) imply a reasonably low (high) taste for
redistribution, while a value of 4 is high enough to proxy the Rawlsian benchmark. Using the
values of gi obtained by inverting the optimal tax model, we estimate expression (9) to recover
the parameter ￿ for each country.
Overall Patterns and Consistency. From results in Figure 4 we ￿rst check whether tax-
bene￿t revealed marginal social welfare functions exhibit reasonable properties. A necessary
condition for them to be Paretian, i.e., non-decreasing at all productivity levels, is that weights
be positive. Our results show that this is the case for all countries and all income groups, even
if weights are close to zero in some speci￿c cases concerning groups 1 and 2, which we shall
discuss in length below.16 Next we discuss the shape of the implicit social welfare functions and
compare the countries￿degree of "Rawlsianity". We ￿rst see that the patterns are consistent
with some social aversion to inequality, with the largest welfare weight placed on the poorest,
the workless poor of group 0, in all countries. Yet this weight is particularly small, and the
overall pattern relatively ￿ at, in places where demogrant policies are absent or marginal, i.e.,
in Southern Europe, Hungary, Estonia and the US. In these countries, revealed preferences
are close to utilitarianism. There are some exceptions and notably a slightly lower weight on
16Using the con￿dence interval of estimated elasticities con￿rms that Paretianity is not rejected, except for the
UK, Sweden, Finland, Belgium and Germany. For these countries, the welfare weight on group 1 turns negative
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Figure 4: Marginal Social Welfare gi
20the top income group due to progressive taxation in some countries, consistent with the more
pronounced progressivity in EMTRs as discussed above (e.g., in Portugal and Greece). We have
also shown that implicit tax levels are higher in Italy, which is re￿ ected here by the fact that
welfare weights are signi￿cantly lower than 1 in the upper half of the distribution. All the other
countries operate some non-marginal transfers towards the bottom of the distribution. As a
result, the weights on group 0 are much higher (sometimes very high, as is the case for Austria,
Denmark, Sweden and Belgium). At the same time, weights on group 1 (and sometimes 2) are
extremely small in most of these systems. This result does not come as a surprise. It simply
re￿ ects the way the optimal tax model rationalizes the very high distortions imposed on the
working poor, as previously discussed.17 For these countries the concavity of the implicit social
welfare function is not ensured at all income levels. This apparent inconsistency may reveal
two things: (i) it is likely that governments had completely di⁄erent beliefs about the extent
of behavioral responses than what is measured by the econometrician, at the time generous
social assistance programs were implemented; (ii) governments may have simply neglected the
working poor, which represent a relatively small population in countries with highly regulated
labor markets (as compared to the US for instance), and implicitly placed higher weights on
the workless poor. Interestingly, the policy trend observed in these countries in the more recent
years precisely consists in a correction of this feature, as discussed below.
Sensitivity to Elasticity Size. We pursue our social welfare characterization with a series
of sensitivity checks around the estimated values of behavioral elasticities. We essentially focus
on di⁄erent scenarios regarding participation elasticities (results for key groups 0 and 1 depend
less crucially on the intensive margin, cf. Saez, 2002). We are mainly interested in international
comparisons, and hence report in Figure 5 the revealed social inequality aversion parameters
￿ obtained under di⁄erent scenarios.18 First of all, we check the consequences of ignoring
cross-country di⁄erences in the size of participation elasticity. Indeed, previous applications of
optimal tax theory usually use uniform values drawn from the literature. For each income group
i = 1;:::;5, we apply the estimated participation elasticity averaged over all countries. Results
are compared to a scenario with uniform participation elasticities as used in Immervoll et al.
(2007), i.e., from :4 in group 1 to 0 in group 5 with step :1. Results in the top-left quadrant
of Figure 5 show that the international ranking in levels of implicit inequality aversion is much
in line with the standard redistribution analysis, placing Southern countries and the US at a
low level of inequality aversion (around :25), while Nordic and Continental European countries
show more Rawlsian preferences (around 1 or above). In addition, it transpires that elasticities
used in Immervoll et al. (2007) do a good job in representing mean estimates: the ranking is
the same in both scenarios, with similar magnitudes of inequality aversion.19
17There are exceptions, e.g., Denmark, where a small extensive-margin elasticity on group 1 compensates this
e⁄ect (cf. Table A.4).
18Not to overload the graphs, we take the mean inequality aversion over the two periods when two years of data
are available. A speci￿c sub-section is dedicated to time change below.
19It is slightly smaller using the elasticities in Immervoll et al. (2007) because the distance between g0 and gI
is smaller, as a result of lower responses in upper income groups (in contrast to their assumption, our estimates
point to non-zero elasticities at the top).
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Figure 5: Tax-bene￿t Revealed Social Inequality Aversion ￿
22Next, one of our main contribution is to check whether cross-country di⁄erences in labor
supply matter. The top-right panel compares the uniform elasticity scenario (based on mean
estimated elasticities) to the results based on country-speci￿c estimates (i.e., the levels of inequal-
ity aversion embodied in the patterns of Figure 4). The ranking is a⁄ected to some extent. For
instance, countries with small, below-average elasticities appear automatically ￿less Rawlsian￿
because the e¢ ciency constraint is not as tight as previously assumed with the mean elasticities.
Interestingly, there is now less variation across countries when ￿true￿elasticities are accounted
for, with Continental Europe, the UK, Ireland and Finland around 1, Southern/Eastern Europe
and the US at lower levels, and Scandinavian countries plus Belgium far above 1.
We also replicate the inversion procedure when using the limit values of the 95% con￿dence
interval of estimated participation elasticities. This directly leads to con￿dence bounds on
marginal social welfare weights as depicted for the US and France in Figure 6. In that example
we observe that the weight on group 0 is signi￿cantly larger in France than in the US, and
weights on higher groups are signi￿cant smaller (and smaller than 1). Without ambiguity, we
can say that under estimated behavioral responses, the implicit preferences in the French welfare
regime are more Rawlsian than in the US system. Di⁄erences are not signi￿cant for all pairs
of countries, however. Transformed into social inequality aversions, results in the bottom-left
quadrant of Figure 5 con￿rm signi￿cantly lower aversion in the US compared to France, but
show an incomplete ordering over all countries. In fact, we can distinguish the same three
groups of countries as delineated above, but di⁄erences between countries within a group are
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Figure 6: Tax-Bene￿t Revealed Social Welfare: US and France
Elasticities: from Econometrics to Politics. We have just characterized the redistribu-
tive preferences embodied in actual tax-bene￿t system when predictions of a structural model
about labor supply elasticity are taken seriously. If we assume instead that governments had
23completely di⁄erent priors about behavioral responses, we may retain an extreme scenario where
elasticities are set to zero. As argued above, this may well apply to the context of Continental
and Nordic European countries when generous demogrant policies were designed.20 To illustrate
this situation, the bottom-right quadrant of Figure 5 compares our baseline results to revealed
inequality aversion in the case where extensive elasticities are zero. While the international rank-
ing is roughly preserved, the absolute aversion level mechanically decreases. More interestingly,
di⁄erences between some countries decrease (e.g. Sweden/Denmark vs. the Netherlands). To
further analyze this point, Figure 7 compares the two scenarios when results are cast in terms of
welfare weights. We focus on four countries with generous demogrant policies and high implicit
taxation on group 1 (and group 2 in Sweden and the Netherlands). When setting participation
elasticities to zero, irregularities on group 1 (and 2) partly disappear, i.e., the distribution of
marginal social welfare weights becomes ￿ atter. Smaller and more similar weights on group 0
can be observed and are consistent with the lower and more similar levels of inequality aversion
discussed above. Admittedly, weights on group 1 (and 2) are still lower than for most other
groups because the policy behind the result has not changed, i.e., the model still rationalizes
the fact that workless poor receive substantial transfers, while working poor receive nothing
(in addition, intensive margin elasticities are non-zero and are actually associated to a move
from 1 to 0 for the working poor). However, and most importantly, our results show that the
likely understatement of behavioral responses by policy makers, together with a genuine de-
sire to redistribute to the poorest, partly explains past inconsistencies in implicit social welfare
patterns.
Time Change and Recent Trends. We exploit the fact that two years of data are available
for some countries. Results are presented for Finland, France, Ireland and the UK in Figure 8
for the policy years 1998 and 2001. On the one hand, very little policy changes occurred for
childless singles in France and the UK over the period.21 Reassuringly, in Figure 8, results for
the two years are consistently similar. On the other hand, more signi￿cant time changes can
be observed for Finland and Ireland. As discussed in Bargain and Callan (2010), several policy
changes have occurred over the short period 1998-2001 that contributed to increase inequalities
in Finland (notably a reduction in tax progressivity) and narrow the gap between groups 0 and
1, as can be seen in Figure 8. ￿Incentive trap reforms￿were carried out as early as the late
1990s in Finland, with tax incentives on low-wage work (via extensions of tax allowance) and
slow nominal adjustment on social transfers, which actually increased ￿nancial gains to work
(Laine, 2002). In Ireland, substantial cuts in income tax have clearly reduced the redistributive
e⁄ect of the system. The overall curve is higher in 2001 because of a change in relative group
20This is witnessed in numerous policy reports of the late 1990s in several EU countries, which highlighted the
fact that safety net designed to prevent extreme poverty possibly became responsible for work disincentives and
"inactivity traps" (see references in Bargain and Doorley, 2011). The same concern that welfare programs had
pushed part of the population into a state of welfare dependency had previously led to the 1996 welfare reforms
in the US.
21For instance, the 1999 boost in the UK in-work support, the WFTC reform, is not apparent as it concerns
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Figure 7: Tax-Bene￿t Revealed Social Welfare: Estimated versus Under-estimated Extensive
Responses (2001)
size ￿ in particular group 0 became smaller ￿ but an extension of the tax-free bracket and
moderation on social assistance have also contributed to improve the relative position of group
1. Similar reforms have taken place in other countries, but unfortunately for a more recent
period that is not covered by our data and tax-bene￿t simulations. Some countries have also
lowered tax rates for low-wage earners or reduced social assistance (in particular Denmark since
2003). Two important types of measures also deserve particular attention as they focus precisely
on the workless/working poor divide. Firstly, in-work supports have been implemented since
2001, in the form of refundable earned income tax credits (in France, cf., Stancanelli, 2008;
the Netherlands and Belgium from 2002 to 2004, cf. Orsini, 2006) or exemptions of SSC (in
Germany with the ￿mini-job￿reform, cf. Steiner and Wrohlich, 2005; in Belgium after 2004).22
Interestingly, most of these reforms consist of individualized schemes and hence directly a⁄ect the
group of childless singles under study.23 Secondly, several countries have implemented activation
policies (for instance within the Hartz IV reform in Germany) or extended existing ones (as in
Nordic countries and notably in Denmark) ￿see Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl (2006). This type
22A possible change in social values in Continental Europe may have occurred, and the role of Anglo-Saxon
in￿ uence and international convergence in this process is potentially important (see Banks et al., 2005), notably
with respect to the principle of ￿making work pay￿ . Note that some of these reforms were, however, relatively
small and unlikely to have changed the weight on group 1 much. This is the case with the French earned income
tax credit, which is included in our simulation for 2001 and is so small that it has almost no e⁄ect. For that
country, things changed more radically in 2009, with a major reform consisting in reducing the withdrawal rate
of social assistance from 100% to 38%.
23The case of the UK is particularly interesting: in the 1990s, the Family Credit followed by the WFTC were
operated for working poor households with children only. Following the 2003 reform, the WFTC was split into a
child tax credit (aimed at reducing child poverty) and a pure in-work support (the Working Tax Credit, WTC)
which became available to all working poor, with or without children.
25of workfare policy is rarely simulated since information concerning active job search is missing.
However this would boil down to a reduction in the (long-run) expected value of social assistance









































































































































Figure 8: Tax-Bene￿t Revealed Social Welfare: Time Change
Direct Evidence on Redistributive Tastes. Results of an inverted optimal tax problem,
as presented here, can be interpreted as revealed preferences. Hence, it is tempting to compare
them to direct measures of social preferences as reported in, e.g., the International Social Sur-
vey Program (ISSP), and exploited in the political economy literature. Precisely, several papers
studying the role of culture and international di⁄erences in redistributive preferences make use
of a question about whether it is the responsibility of the government to reduce di⁄erences in
income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes (see, e.g., Corneo and
Gr￿ner, 2002, Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009). For a subset of countries for which similar periods
are available, we translate answers to this question in a score measure and compare it against
our revealed inequality aversion index. Not surprisingly, the most robust result is the divide
between the US and Continental/Nordic Europe, mainly because low tastes for redistribution
in the US support the low inequality aversion embodied in the tax-bene￿t system (for a speci￿c
analysis of the EU and US di⁄erence, see Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). The UK has a somewhat
intermediary position. For the rest, citizens of Southern and Eastern countries show the highest
levels of support for redistribution, while living among the least redistributive systems. Why
redistributive tastes do not translate into more redistributive policies is still an open question,
clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, we can say that the broad group of countries
with low levels of revealed inequality aversion in our results is mixed and in￿ uenced by possibly
very di⁄erent cultural and historical characteristics. For Eastern countries, the negative corre-
lation between declared preferences and revealed inequality aversion is not only consistent with
26persistent left-wing ideology (Corneo and Gr￿ner, 2002, Alesina and Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln, 2007)
but also with the increasing public sentiment that the process of income distribution was in
fact ￿ awed and ine¢ cient (Grosfeld and Senik, 2010).24 In Southern Europe, family support
is still seen as a substitute to state intervention towards the unemployed and low-wage work-
ers (see Bentolila and Ichino, 2008) ￿yet political scientists describe Southern systems as an
immature version of Continental Corporatist systems (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Strong reliance
on the market is observed in the US, together with targeted policies (aimed at child poverty
alleviation) and desert-sensitive redistribution, notably through EITC-type of instruments (on
the range of safety net instruments, their e⁄ectiveness and their evolution over the past 35 years
in the US, see Scholz et al., 2009).
7 Conclusion
Deriving social welfare functions implicit in di⁄erent national tax-bene￿t systems provides an
interesting way of checking how far we are from the ￿ction of a Paretian social planner and
comparing countries￿implicit tastes for redistribution. We follow this path by inverting the
optimal tax model suggested by Saez (2002) for a large set of countries, i.e., we characterize
the social welfare weights that rationalize tax-bene￿t institutions in the US and 17 European
countries. Since we aim to compare pure vertical equity concerns across countries, we focus
on a homogenous group ￿childless singles. To approximate true behavioral responses, we esti-
mate labor supply on the same datasets and retrieve elasticities at the extensive and intensive
margins. Heterogeneity in work-consumption preferences a⁄ects international comparisons in
terms of revealed inequality aversion to some extent. More importantly, as a consequence of
the estimated variances of labor supply preferences, di⁄erences in tax-bene￿t revealed social
preferences across nations are greatly attenuated. Essential di⁄erences remain between broad
groups of countries only. Social welfare weights are positive and tend to decrease with income
level, with more Rawlsian pro￿les in Nordic/Continental Europe compared to Eastern/Southern
Europe and the US. However, in the former set of countries, transfers to the workless poor ￿
and the absence of transfers to the working poor for the period and group considered ￿lead to
some non-concavity of the implicit social welfare function. This is coherent with the fact that
governments￿beliefs regarding behavioral responses are not necessarily those of the econome-
trician ￿and were possibly greatly understated when generous social assistance schemes were
implemented in Europe. Interestingly, policy developments at the turn of the century and in
recent years tend to correct this ￿anomaly￿either through the development of individualized
in-work support (in the UK and Continental Europe) or activation and workfare policies (in
Scandinavian countries). These policy trends possibly denote a reassessment of potential labor
supply responses by governments, but also a likely change in social preferences toward more
desert-sensitive policies.
24Note however that national surveys point to higher tolerance for inequality in Eastern European countries
(see Senik, 2008, using the TARKI Hungarian Household Panel, the NORBALT II for Estonia, the national
representative household survey for Poland). Hence, according to this alternative data, there would be more
similarity between revealed and observed preferences. Senik (2008) relates low preference for redistribution in
Eastern countries and the US to beliefs in more income mobility (at least compared to "old" Europe).
27Future research could extend our results in various ways. Firstly, it is in principle possible
to replicate the analysis on di⁄erent (demographically homogenous) groups. Most interestingly,
an examination of couples would show more variations in policies over time and across countries
(i.e., EITC and WFTC would enter the analysis). As argued in the text, however, the treatment
of joint labor supply decisions in an optimal tax framework is not an easy task (see Kleven et
al., 2009). Secondly, we have considered a partial optimization problem by looking at direct
taxes and transfers. Some other policies may well have redistributive e⁄ects, including non-cash
bene￿ts (see Haan and Wrohlich, 2007) and public goods like public health and education. In
particular, systems where health insurance is ￿nanced by proportional to income contributions
(or progressive taxation), but tranfers are universal, must generate substantial redistribution.
Thirdly, tax-bene￿t policies are part of a broader set of policy decisions including labor market
regulations, minimum wages, among others. In that respect, high redistribution towards the
workless poor is consistent with high minimum wages and stringent regulations that produce in-
sider/outsider segmentations. Indeed, demogrant policies complement unemployment insurance
in this type of labor market, especially for young workers (who have never contributed to social
security) or long-term unemployed (who have exhausted their rights). In contrast in Anglo-
Saxon countries, more ￿ exible labor markets have generated more working poverty and hence
the need for appropriate (in-work) transfers of the EITC-type. These considerations should be
better incorporated in the present framework.
Finally, it is natural to think that real world tax-bene￿t schedules result from complex
historical shocks and political economy forces rather than from the pursuit of some well de￿ned
social objectives. Nevertheless, the ￿ction of a social planner can be seen as a proxy for a more
complex political model (Coughlin, 1992, shows equivalence between a planner with a weighted
social welfare function and a probabilistic voting model with two candidates competing for
votes). In fact, very little is known about the complex mechanisms behind tax-bene￿t policy
design in the real world, which involves many dimensions (e.g., labor market policies, as noted
above) and agents (e.g., unions, lobbies, experts, international in￿ uence) often not accounted for
by theory. It would nonetheless be interesting to extend the present approach to some explicit
political economy model (see, e.g., Atella et al., 2005) ￿even if simple representations like the
median voter hypothesis are clearly of limited applicability (cf. Alesina and Giuliano, 2011) and
social choice models in presence of endogenous labor supply are rare. It could also be interesting
to replicate the exercise suggested in this paper with non-welfarist objectives (e.g., Kanbur et
al., 2006) or welfare measures that preserve individual heterogeneity (see Decoster and Haan,
2010).
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33A Appendix A: Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Description of the Discretized Population of Childless Singles
Country AT BE BE DK FI FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE
Year 98 98 01 95 98 01 95 01 98 01 95 95 00
Data ECHP PSB PSB ECHP IDS IDS HBS HBS SOEP SOEP HBS LIS LIS
Gross income Yi (note: Y0 = 0)
1 222 203 238 127 190 185 139 189 172 145 113 215 187
2 376 347 392 397 329 356 286 301 373 359 165 371 361
3 452 436 502 545 398 437 360 373 471 490 216 470 454
4 577 532 613 646 481 528 457 467 576 605 263 542 651
5 845 737 856 860 704 769 732 703 814 889 476 724 882
Disposable income Ci
0 61 96 138 140 110 113 110 151 59 80 1 67 65
1 183 181 214 154 178 181 134 171 148 141 101 199 206
2 277 243 284 282 242 273 217 232 245 250 145 287 334
3 321 286 341 367 279 314 267 276 298 320 189 337 433
4 394 333 394 428 326 368 335 338 345 381 219 374 539
5 533 435 510 518 434 491 519 482 475 520 358 478 689
Effective "Marginal" Tax Rate (EMTR)
1 45% 58% 68% 89% 64% 64% 83% 89% 49% 58% 12% 38% 24%
2 39% 57% 54% 53% 54% 46% 43% 45% 51% 49% 15% 44% 27%
3 42% 52% 48% 42% 46% 48% 34% 39% 47% 47% 14% 49% -6%
4 42% 50% 53% 40% 43% 42% 28% 34% 55% 47% 37% 49% 46%
5 48% 50% 52% 58% 51% 49% 33% 39% 45% 51% 35% 43% 35%
Effective Participation Tax Rate (EPTR)
1 45% 58% 68% 89% 64% 64% 83% 89% 49% 58% 12% 38% 24%
2 43% 57% 63% 64% 60% 55% 62% 73% 50% 53% 13% 41% 25%
3 42% 56% 59% 58% 58% 54% 57% 66% 49% 51% 13% 43% 19%
4 42% 55% 58% 55% 55% 52% 51% 60% 50% 50% 17% 43% 27%
5 44% 54% 57% 56% 54% 51% 44% 53% 49% 51% 25% 43% 29%
Group size hi (in %)
0 0.04 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.31 0.30 0.13
1 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.18
2 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.20
3 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.15
4 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.19
5 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.16
# observations 206 357 278 518 931 963 1,080 1,013 967 933 164 148 130
This table reports information on income groups for the selected samples. Policy years are 1998, 2001 or 2005. Countries are: AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, DK=Denmark,
FI=Finland, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IE=Ireland. Datasets are: ECHP=European Community Household Panel, PSB=Panel Survey on Belgian
Households, HBS=Household Budget Survey, IDS=Income Distribution Survey, SOEP=German Socio-Economic Panel, LIS=Living in Ireland Survey. Group 0 = non-
participants and Y0=0. Other groups: increasing income levels of participants. EMTR are calculated as 1 - {C i - C i-1}/{Y i -Y i-1} and EPTR as 1 - {Ci - C0}/{Y i -
Y 0} for all income groups i>0. All incomes in euros per week.
34Table A.2: Description of the Discretized Population of Childless Singles (cont.)
Country IT NL PT SP SP UK UK SW EE HU PL US
Year 95 00 01 96 01 95 01 01 05 05 05 06
Data SHIW SOEP ECHP ECHP ECHP FES FES IDS HBS HBS HBS CPS
Gross income Yi (note: Y0 = 0)
1 188 189 88 134 165 221 229 172 33 41 36 162
2 314 400 150 238 250 361 397 359 56 72 71 362
3 381 505 222 327 335 463 522 439 77 109 102 528
4 484 617 368 458 423 573 661 522 102 151 141 715
5 632 867 639 649 646 818 999 760 152 267 238 1194
Disposable income Ci
0 3 137 25 17 6 133 144 151 13 16 3 17
1 129 186 77 126 151 191 205 179 33 44 17 149
2 209 298 128 204 215 289 316 247 48 64 25 303
3 251 361 182 268 281 362 406 293 65 86 40 426
4 299 443 273 364 339 441 507 345 84 105 59 557
5 375 599 416 496 491 622 751 478 120 162 106 863
Effective "Marginal" Tax Rate (EMTR)
1 33% 74% 41% 19% 13% 74% 73% 84% 38% 33% 60% 18%
2 37% 47% 18% 25% 24% 30% 34% 64% 35% 35% 78% 23%
3 37% 40% 24% 27% 23% 28% 28% 43% 21% 42% 53% 26%
4 53% 27% 38% 27% 34% 28% 28% 36% 23% 55% 50% 30%
5 48% 37% 47% 31% 32% 26% 28% 44% 27% 50% 52% 36%
Effective Participation Tax Rate (EPTR)
1 33% 74% 41% 19% 13% 74% 73% 84% 38% 33% 60% 18%
2 34% 60% 31% 22% 16% 57% 57% 73% 37% 34% 69% 21%
3 35% 55% 29% 23% 18% 50% 50% 68% 32% 36% 64% 23%
4 39% 50% 33% 24% 21% 46% 45% 63% 30% 42% 60% 25%
5 41% 47% 39% 26% 25% 40% 39% 57% 29% 45% 57% 29%
Group size hi (in %)
0 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.06
1 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.19
2 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.20
3 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.19
4 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.18
5 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.19
# observations 163 555 106 191 202 561 669 1,768 233 354 1,273 7,053
This table reports information on income groups for the selected sample. Policy years are 1998, 2001 or 2005. Countries are: IT=Italy, NL=the Netherlands,
PT=Portugal, SP=Spain, UK=the United Kingdom, SW=Sweden, EE=Estonia, HU=Hungary, PL=Poland, US=the United States. Datasets are:
ECHP=European Community Household Panel, HBS=Household Budget Survey, IDS=Income Distribution Survey, SOEP=Dutch Socio-Economic Panel,
SHIW=Survey of Households Income and Wealth, FES=Family Expenditure Survey, CPS=Current Population Survey. Notes: Group 0 = non-participants and
Y0=0. Other groups: increasing income levels of participants. EMTR are calculated as 1 - {Ci - Ci-1}/{Yi -Yi-1} and EPTR as 1 - {Ci - C0}/{Yi - Y0} for
all income groups i>0. All incomes in euros per week.
35Table A.3: Goodness of Fit: Hour Mean and Distributions
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01
Pseudo-R2 0.29 0.36 0.36 0.40
Particip.: observed .88 .78 .81 .80 .78 .83 .83 .80 .82 .66 .56 .73
Particip.: predicted .90 .77 .82 .80 .76 .83 .84 .79 .80 .64 .53 .71
gap % 2.8% -1.2% 1.4% -0.4% -3.0% -0.5% 0.3% -2.0% -3.1% -3.7% -4.8% -1.8%
Hours: observed 32.8 30.2 31.0 30.7 30.8 31.6 30.2 28.9 29.7 26.6 21.1 24.9
Hours: predicted 33.7 28.6 30.2 30.4 29.6 31.4 30.1 28.4 28.7 25.5 20.3 24.4
gap % 2.7% -5.2% -2.5% -1.0% -3.8% -0.5% 0.0% -1.7% -3.6% -4.2% -3.8% -1.9%
IT NL PT SP SP UK UK SW EE HU PL US
98 01 01 98 01 98 01 01 05 05 05 05
Pseudo-R2 0.22 0.27 0.25 0.15 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.30
Particip.: observed .74 .85 .79 .70 .79 .64 .72 .87 .81 .83 .66 .83
Particip.: predicted .74 .85 .83 .69 .80 .64 .73 .86 .81 .83 .66 .82
gap % -1.0% 0.7% 6.1% -1.9% 1.4% 0.4% 0.9% -0.6% -0.1% -0.6% 0.5% -0.7%
Hours: observed 28.0 30.1 30.2 26.8 30.1 24.5 27.2 30.9 31.9 33.1 24.6 34.5
Hours: predicted 27.9 30.1 31.6 26.3 30.6 24.5 27.4 30.1 31.9 32.8 24.6 34.3
gap % -0.4% 0.0% 4.8% -1.8% 1.4% 0.2% 0.9% -2.5% 0.0% -0.8% 0.0% -0.6%
0.26 0.27

















































36Table A.4: Labor Supply Elasticities
AT BE BE DK FI FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE
98 98 01 95 98 01 95 01 98 01 95 95 00
Standard elasticities
Wage elasticity - Hours .13 .25 .31 .09 .27 .16 .14 .13 .20 .17 .24 .25 .50
(.05) (.05) (.06) (.04) (.05) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.05) (.07) (.08)
Wage elasticity - Participation .10 .22 .24 .12 .28 .15 .11 .11 .19 .16 .23 .32 .44
(.04) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.06) (.07)
Income elasticity - Hours .00 .00 .00 .00 .10 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 -.03 -.02
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Saez (2002)'s elasticities
Intensive margin:
Mean .10 .16 .25 .04 .08 .04 .08 .06 .09 .11 .09 .20 .36
Group 1 .14 .43 .38 .04 .23 .09 .06 .05 .38 .39 .18 .66 .45
(.06) (.11) (.09) (.01) (.04) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.07) (.08) (.09) (.17) (.08)
Group 2 .17 .20 .47 .06 .05 .03 .09 .06 .03 .02 .07 .26 .86
(.06) (.04) (.10) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.02) (.11) (.17)
Group 3 .05 .13 .28 .05 .02 .03 .06 .04 .03 .07 .02 .15 .52
(.02) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.05)
Group 4 .10 .07 .09 .04 .04 .02 .06 .05 .03 .05 .07 .03 .19
(.04) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.05)
Group 5 .04 .10 .22 .04 .05 .03 .12 .12 .03 .04 .08 .03 .33
(.02) (.02) (.11) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.05)
Extensive margin:
Mean .15 .35 .35 .17 .30 .14 .09 .09 .20 .22 .34 .57 .38
Group 1 .14 .43 .38 .04 .23 .09 .06 .05 .38 .39 .18 .66 .45
(.04) (.07) (.05) (.01) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.04) (.05) (.05) (.08) (.08)
Group 2 .16 .53 .46 .16 .32 .11 .12 .07 .17 .21 .53 .78 .56
(.05) (.08) (.07) (.03) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.10) (.10) (.10)
Group 3 .19 .25 .24 .24 .35 .13 .10 .09 .25 .25 .40 .51 .49
(.05) (.04) (.03) (.06) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.07) (.08) (.08)
Group 4 .14 .38 .42 .18 .22 .20 .11 .09 .11 .15 .34 .60 .27
(.04) (.04) (.07) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.06) (.05) (.05)
Group 5 .11 .15 .23 .23 .36 .19 .07 .14 .10 .08 .27 .30 .12
(.02) (.02) (.07) (.05) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.05) (.11) (.11)
Note: standard elasticities are computed numerically by simulation of responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates or unearned income. Saez elasticities are obtained by simulated increases
corresponding to 1% of the difference in mean disposable incomes between a given income group and the closest lower group (mobility) or the group of nonworkers (participation). Bootstrapped
standard errors in brackets.
37Table A.5: Labor Supply Elasticities (cont.)
IT NL PT SP SP UK UK SW EE HU PL US Mean
95 00 01 96 01 95 01 01 05 05 05 06
Standard elasticities
Wage elasticity - Hours .47 .11 .04 .27 .39 .41 .21 .17 .15 .14 .08 .20 .22
(.10) (.02) (.04) (.07) (.04) (.05) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Wage elasticity - Participation .42 .09 .04 .27 .32 .33 .20 .14 .14 .13 .07 .17 .20
(.09) (.01) (.03) (.06) (.04) (.04) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.03)
Income elasticity - Hours .03 .00 .00 -.01 -.01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .06 .00 .00 .01
(.02) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Saez (2002)'s elasticities
Intensive margin:
Mean .28 .12 .08 .12 .44 .06 .07 .06 .07 .07 .04 .18 .13
Group 1 .70 .16 .11 .25 .87 .10 .13 .11 .10 .11 .09 .33 .26
(.14) (.04) (.26) (.10) (.12) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.07)
Group 2 .47 .19 .07 .11 .50 .07 .05 .12 .02 .06 .03 .09 .17
(.10) (.04) (.15) (.04) (.06) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Group 3 .14 .04 .05 .03 .37 .01 .01 .04 .05 .09 .03 .13 .06
(.03) (.01) (.06) (.01) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Group 4 .08 .05 .07 .08 .11 .03 .04 .02 .07 .05 .03 .12 .05
(.02) (.01) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Group 5 .03 .15 .09 .12 .33 .06 .11 .04 .10 .04 .05 .20 .10
(.01) (.16) (.04) (.04) (.12) (.01) (.07) (.03) (.05) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Extensive margin:
Mean .59 .11 .06 .32 .43 .21 .18 .17 .12 .06 .09 .28 .24
Group 1 .70 .16 .11 .25 .87 .10 .13 .11 .10 .11 .09 .33 .26
(.11) (.02) (.03) (.07) (.12) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Group 2 .67 .13 .13 .50 .62 .21 .20 .21 .08 .03 .09 .34 .30
(.11) (.02) (.04) (.13) (.07) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.05)
Group 3 .50 .14 .07 .25 .36 .17 .21 .14 .11 .08 .07 .33 .24
(.09) (.01) (.02) (.06) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Group 4 .64 .09 .01 .32 .17 .23 .19 .21 .14 .03 .10 .25 .22
(.11) (.01) (.02) (.05) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03)
Group 5 .46 .04 .01 .26 .12 .34 .18 .17 .17 .05 .09 .13 .17
(.09) (.01) (.02) (.04) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.04)
Note: standard elasticities are computed numerically by simulation of responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates or unearned income. Saez elasticities are obtained by simulated increases
corresponding to 1% of the difference in mean disposable incomes between a given income group and the closest lower group (mobility) or the group of nonworkers (participation). Bootstrapped
standard errors in brackets.
38Table A.6: Taxes, Social Contributions and Transfers of Childless Singles
Austria Belgium Denmark Estonia Finland France
Income Tax System
No of tax bands 4 5 3 1 6 6
Lowest/highest tax band limit * § 17 / 231 24 / 318 12 / 100 21 35 / 223 30 / 336
Lowest/highest tax rate £ .21 / .50 .25 / .55 .40 / .59 .24 / .24 .235 / .557 .185 / .62
Main tax credit* 5 PPE (in 2001)
Employee Social Security Contributions
SSC exemption below earnings* 13 some SSC rebates
Lower/upper contrib. limit ** no / 145
Starting/finishing rate (%) 18.06 13.07
8 + lump sum
charge (3% of AW)
3 3 6.6
21.36 / 8.61         (4
rates)
Maximum contribution** 26.1
Tax deductible yes yes yes yes yes
Social A ssistance (not taxable, except Denmark)








Disregard* 9 up to 9












Payment Rate** 55% of net 42-60% of gross
90% of gross minus
SSC
40-50% of gross


























Taxable @ IT: no, SSC: no
IT: reduced, SSC:
no
IT: yes, SSC: partly IT: no, SSC: no IT: no, SSC: no IT: yes, SSC: yes
* All monetary levels in % of median gross employment income (not including employer social security contributions)
** All monetary level in % of Average Worker Wage (AWW)
@ IT = income tax; SSC = social security contributions
§  The lowest bound accounts for std tax-free allowances/deductions/exemptions for single employees, i.e. represents the upper bound of the zero-tax income range
£ Rates include special social security tax. In France, CSG: 7.5% and CRDS: 0.5%. They combine flat-tax municipal taxation and progressive national taxation for Finland and
Denmark (municipal tax rates differ between municipalities and we count here the average: 17.5% in Finland, 32.4% in Denmark). In Denmark, a "tax shield" of 59% is applied as
the top rate.
Source: EUROMOD country reports, OECD Benefit and Wages, MISSOC 1998.
Unemployment Benefits (shown for initial phase of unempl., after waiting period if applicable, for persons aged 30+. Insurance to some extent voluntary in DK and FI)
Notes: We focus here on taxation and transfers to childless singles (all benefit and tax rates above are for this demographic group) for the year 1998 except PL, HU, EE and US
(year 2005/6).
39Table A.7: Taxes, Social Contributions and Transfers of Childless Singles (cont.)
Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Netherlands
Income Tax System
No of tax bands 3 £ 3 2 2 5 4
Lowest/highest tax band limit * § 30 / 252 56 / 478 0 / 82 25 / 80 0 / 118 20 / 212
Lowest/highest tax rate £ .273 / .557 .05 / .45 .18 / .36 .24 / .46 .185 / .455 .36 / .60
Main tax credit * &
max. 15% of accepted
expenditure
up to 6
Employee Social Security Contributions
Lower/upper contrib. limit ** 12 / 150 no / 285 51 / no no / 371
Starting/finishing rate [%] 20.85 / 13 (2 rates) 16 8.5 / 5 (2 rates) 4 / 2 (2 rates)
9.19 / 10.19 (2
rates)
32.6 / 5.85 (4 rates)
+ lump sum charge
Maximum contribution** 27.4 45.6 36.1 32.2
Tax deductible yes yes no no yes partly
Special features phase-in; +0.25%
extra payments for
some employees
Social A ssistance (not taxable)
Max. amount* 13 11 29 + housing supp.






Withdrawal rate .75 - 1 1 1 1
Housing Benefit
Max. amount* 25 2 see Social Assistance
none at the national
level
6 (for low rents)
Withdrawal rate .40 0.54
Floor* 28
41 (if previous job
full-time)
Payment Rate** 60% of net 40-70% of gross 65% of gross
flat-rate: 16 (EUR
96/week)





5-12 months (dep. on
employment period)
up to 9 months
(dep. on
contribution)





min. of 126 or 70% of
gross





Taxable @ no IT: reduced, SSC: no IT: yes, SSC: partly IT: reduced, SSC: no IT: yes, SSC: no IT: yes, SSC: yes
£: In Germany: MTR increases progressively between lower and middle / middle and top tax bands; rates include solidarity surplus tax of 5.5%
Unemployment Benefits (shown for initial phase of unempl., after waiting period if applicable, for persons aged 30+)
&: Employment-related benefits exist in Ireland (FIS) and Italy but do not concern childless single households
40Table A.8: Taxes, Social Contributions and Transfers of Childless Singles (cont.)
Poland Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom United States
Income Tax System
No of tax bands 3 6 8 2 3 6
Lowest/highest tax band limit * § 5 / 259 0 / 490 22 / 492 4 / 92 29 / 220 26 / 1066
Lowest/highest tax rate .19 / .40 .05 / .40 .20 / .56 .30 / .55 .20 / .40 10 / 35





Employee Social Security Contributions
SSC exemption below earnings threshold * 35 5
Lower/upper contrib. limit ** no / 165 no / 110 17 / no
Starting/finishing rate [%] 25.62 11 6.35 7 11 / 1 (2 rates) 7.65 / 1.45 (2 rates)
Maximum contribution** 10.5 7.7










Social A ssistance (not taxable)
Max. amount* 20 20





Disregard* 2 - 4
occasional income
up to USD 120
Withdrawal rate 1 0.8 1 1 1
Housing Benefit
Max. amount* 15
none at the national
level
none at the national
level
6 (only if aged <30)
100% of recognised






























max. 6 months max. 6 months
Ceiling* 146 75 66 18%
61% of average
worker
Taxable @ IT: no, SSC: no IT: yes, SSC: reduced IT: yes, SSC: yes IT: yes, SSC: no



















































































































































































gross income + all benefits
gross income + all benefits - SSC
disposable income (gross + ben - SSC - tax)
% reduction
Sample: selection of childless singles. Bars (left x-axis) represent Gini coefficients of equivalized income for different income concepts
from gross/market income to disposable income (gross income +benefits - SSC - taxes). We also represent (right x-axis) the %
reduction in Gini due to tax-benefit policies. Countries are ranked according to the Gini of disposable income.
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Figure A.2: Vertical Redistribution: Impact of Unemployment Bene￿ts and Sample Selection
42B Appendix B: Robustness Checks
B.1 Labor Supply
Discrete choice models are very general as they impose minimum constraints on preferences and
allow accounting for complete tax-bene￿t policies a⁄ecting household budgets. We nonetheless
check whether our estimates are sensitive to several crucial aspects of the model speci￿cation.
We focus on the own-wage and income elasticities of total hours and participation. Starting from
our baseline speci￿cation, i.e., a 7-choice model with quadratic utility and ￿xed costs, we ￿rstly
check whether the way the choice set is discretized plays some role. An alternative model with
J = 4 choices essentially captures the commonly agreed durations of work: non-participation
(0), part-time (20), full-time (40) and overtime (50 hours/week). A narrower discretization with
13 choices, from 0 to 60 hours/week with a step of 5 hours, is more computationally demanding
but may better capture country-speci￿c hour distributions and, in fact, get closer to a continuous
speci￿cation. Secondly, we check whether elasticities are sensitive to the functional form at use.
Similar to van Soest et al. (2001) for the Netherlands, we experiment alternative speci￿cations
by increasing the order of the polynomial in the utility function: quadratic (baseline) then cubic
and quartic. We also change the way ￿ exibility is gained in the model by replacing ￿xed costs
of work, as used in Blundell et al. (2000), by part-time dummies, precisely at the 10, 20 and 30
hour choices, as used in van Soest (1995). These parameters may be interpreted as job search
costs for less common working hours (van Soest and Das, 2001), and hence include some of
the labor market restriction on the choice set. Results show that elasticity estimates are very
stable across model speci￿cations, giving con￿dence in the results and conveying that the size of
elasticities is not driven by methodological choices (detailed tables of result available from the
authors; see also Bargain et al., 2011, for a detailed exposition).
B.2 Inverse Optimal Tax Problem
The inverted optimal tax characterization suggested in the present study has relied on some
assumptions concerning income group de￿nition and the treatment of UB in particular. We
suggest here a robustness check on these two issues.
The Treatment of Replacement Incomes. In our baseline, contributory bene￿ts, essen-
tially UB, were treated as a replacement income derived from a pure insurance mechanism.25
In some countries, however, unemployment insurance payments are detached from contributions
and hence can be interpreted as a form of redistribution. We suggest here a variant that takes
an alternative and slightly longer-term perspective by treating all non-workers as if they had
exhausted their rights to social security (this may indeed take several months or years, as indi-
cated in Tables A.6, A.7 and A.8). That is, UB are set to zero for job seekers, and they receive
25In their baseline, Immervoll et al. (2007) assign UB recipients to group 0, i.e., treat UB as pure redistribution,
but recognize that this is a relatively conservative approach. Alternatively, they replace UB by social assistance
for job seekers in group 0, which is the same variant presented here. More generally, note that the di⁄erences in
the extent of social security programs among developed countries, along with the substitution between public and
private insurance, have driven the literature to limit redistributive analyses to non-contributive social bene￿ts
and taxes.
43(simulated) social assistance, when available. The size of group 0 is then necessarily larger in
this scenario. Results are presented in the left panel of Figure B.1. Some countries like Denmark
appear to favor redistribution slightly less in this case, but the international ranking is broadly
preserved. It is reassuring that previous interpretations of our results survive this alternative,
reasonable treatment.
Income Groups. The de￿nition of the I + 1 groups in Saez￿model necessarily bears some
arbitrariness in the way the population is partitioned. Firstly, we have opted for a small number
of income groups (I + 1 = 6) to ease comparisons across countries. We check results obtained
with I = 11 groups (10 groups of workers and the unemployed). While some "noise" indeed
appears in a few cases, the main results of the paper are preserved (detailed graphs available
from the authors). Arguably, opting for a larger number of groups would lead to too small group
size for a meaningful interpretation of the optimal tax model (in this case, Paretianity may be
violated if group i = 1 is small enough to capture the few "statically irrational" households who
face 100% EMTR in some countries). Secondly, the choice of cut-o⁄ points might be critical
when trying to make group de￿nitions comparable across countries. By construction, group 0
(workless poor) is identi￿ed as the population with zero market income. In our baseline the
other groups were simply income quintiles among the workers. We suggest an alternative group
de￿nition that places particular focus on the crucial role of group 1 (the working poor) and
the tension occurring in the optimal tax model between this group, group 0 and the tax payers
(i > 1).26 We ￿nd that results are mostly insensitive to income group de￿nition (cf. the right
panel of Figure B.1). We explain this as follows: (i) with reasonable de￿nitions of group 1, we
always capture, to some extent, the gap between groups 0 and 1&2; (ii) the rest of the social
welfare weight distribution is relatively ￿ at, so that alternative de￿nitions of higher income
groups have little impact.
26Since ￿working poor￿ is a ill-de￿ned concept, and rather than ￿xing an arbitrary poverty line, we suggest
simply taking (1+x) times the minimum wage (full-time equivalent income) as the income upper bound for that
group. This can be used to adopt institutional de￿nitions of working poverty (e.g., , individualized earned income
tax credits targeted at the working poor in the early 2000s in France and Belgium relied on such a de￿nition
with x = 30%, which we adopt here). We use o¢ cial or implicit national minimum wages as reported by the
OECD (Immervoll, 2007). Groups 2 to 5 are then de￿ned in proportion of the median income in order to account
consistently for the income distributions of each country. Group 2 is upper bound by the median income, group
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Figure B.1: Revealed Social Inequality Aversion: Robustness Checks
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